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A Typology of Suburban Economic
Development Policy Orientations
John P. Pelissero
Loyola University of Chicago
David Fasenfest
University of Louisville
This article explores variations in economic development goals and orientations
among suburban governments and the impact of these on economic development
programs. The research was conducted among suburban officials in the Chicago
Metropolitan area who responded to a survey in 1987. The results of the survey show
that suburbs can be divided into five types based upon their economic development
policies: aggressive, regulatory, cooperative, retentive, and reactive. These general
policy orientations were found to affect the specific city government staffing, planning,
activities, fiscal programs, and regulation related to economic development in the
community.

Developing the economic base of urban areas remains one of the top issues of the late 1980s.
Indeed, city upon city is found searching for new ways to retain the existing industrial base,
diversify the economy, keep current retailers satisfied, and attract new businesses and industries
to the jurisdiction. Often this search is a zero sum game, pitting one city against another, with only
one winner in the battle for economic development. Such intense competition is more apparent in
our large, fragmented metropolitan areas. Much of the research on urban economic development
has focused on central city policies and problems,1 industrial decisions regarding urban location,z
and successful state/local strategies for attracting industry and expanding the labor force. 3 Study
of economic development by local governments within a shared metropolitan political economy
is not found. Yet this is an area appropriate for examination of several important questions on
development. This article seeks to aid our understanding of intrametropolitan economic development policies. The purpose of this research is to explore variations in economic development policy
orientations and their impact on the adoption of suburban development policies. The article reports
the results of a survey of 105 suburbs in the Chicago metropolitan area.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ORIENTATIONS: A REVIEW
Within any community, the objectives of economic development policies are essentially the
same: (1) to expand the community's tax base, (2) to maintain and attract commercial and industrial
investment in the community, (3) to create and retain employment opportunities for community
residents, and (4) to foster the image of a stable or growing community that will be attractive to
residents, businesses, investors, and lenders. In order to meet these objectives, communities pursue
a varied set of development strategies, including publicly subsidized industrial sites, tax abate-
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The appearance of only
a modest volume of
research on suburban
economic development
and development policies
may be linked to the
common notion that
suburbia, in general, is
far better off than
central city areas and
has not been forced to
consider action
programs for
redevelopment and
revitalization as have
many declining central
cities.

ments and exemptions, low interest loans, infrastructure improvements (e.g., water systems,
;treets), industrial parks, and even advertising campaigns.4
Much of the research on urban economic development has focused on large central cities. Few
research projects have considered the economic development orientations and policies within a
metropolitan area. 5 But when one examines metropolitan America, urban development is generally
found to be uneven across cities. 6 The metropolitan political economy can produce advantages and
disadvantages to development for any city, including the suburbs.? If one accepts Paul Peterson's
thesis in City Limits B that development policies are of primary interest to a city, then local
policymakers must strive to find ways to offset community disadvantages while stimulating
advantages in the community.
Public choice theorists contend that suburban areas foster healthy market conditions for
competition of divergent policies related to development. 9 The variety of development programs
in a city, like other policies and services, presents the potential business or industrial client with a
smorgasbord of options that, following the Tiebout theory,IO ultimately produce efficiency in
community tax and service policies. But uneven development and competitive policies can lead
to inefficiencies in suburban economic development strategies,ll forcing some suburban governments to become more aggressive just to maintain their tax or employment base.
The appearance of only a modest volume of research on suburban economic developmene 2 and
development policies may be linked to the common notion that suburbia, in general, is far better
off than central city areas and has not been forced to consider action programs for redevelopment
and revitalization as have many declining central cities. Indeed, if 75% of all manufacturing
employment (as of 1980) is located outside of central cities, including 42% in the suburbs,l3 and
most major new retail malls in metropolitan areas are found in suburbs,l4 and suburbs are the
preferred location of newer service and high technology industries,15 why focus upon suburbs
rather than central cities in this policy area? The reason is precisely because there are significant
differences among suburbs and some important similarities in the condition of central cities when
it comes to economic development.
A framework for the study of suburbs can be gleaned from the extant literature on communities. 16 A review of this literature suggests that there are three distinct types of communities, in
addition to the central city, in which the residents and leaders can be expected to hold different
orientations toward economic development.
(1) Aging Developed. Older suburbs in the inner ring near the central city have been shown to
be afflicted by many of the same problems as their older central cities. Fernandez and Pincus point
out that, like the central city, older suburbs are suffering "a general decline in population,
demographic change, fiscal pressure, stagnating income, and a variety of social problems."I? We
hypothesize that these suburbs will have the most aggressive economic development policies and
that the policies will be designed to meet the competition from newer suburbs.
(2) Established Developed. A second group of suburbs are essentially fully developed, though
not as old as those in the inner ring, and are most concerned with stability in their established
economic base. While the older suburbs are likely to pursue economic development with aggressive policies, we would expect the stable, developed suburbs to pursue policies that promote
retention of existing commercial interests and caution with any proposed expansion or change in
the community's economic activities. IS
(3) Growing Developing. The third group of suburbs can be classified based upon growth in
developable residential and nonresidential land and continuing development of the economic base.
They may be newer suburbs or they may have been established years ago but still have large areas
of undeveloped land. Because of the availability of commercial land, we anticipate that these
suburbs normally do not have to adopt any economic development strategies. Rather, these suburbs
pursue development in a planned, logical fashion, with significant regulation of all proposed
development. This latter group tends to be the most economically secure among suburban
communities. The developing suburbs are likely to be the least engaged in developing competitive
policies because of their sound economic base that is still enlarging without any formal stimulation
by the city government.
In this article we assume that suburban cities within the same metropolitan political economy
must contend not only with market forces, but also with the strategic development policies of the

Pelissero, Fasenfest / SUBURBAN DEVELOPMENT

central city and, more important, the~urrounding suburbs. Hence, any suburban city's development
policies are likely to be stimulated by the city's own development needs and the state ofthe private
market, and also by what is being done by the public policy makers in neighboring competitive
jurisdictions. John Levy has aptly described the intense competition for new industries that takes
place among cities. "The firm known to be contemplating a move, or even the firm which simply
looks as though it would be a good addition to the local economy and tax base, is often besieged
by suitors." 19 This article seeks to examine the nature of economic development policy orientations
among suburbs in a common political economy.

RESEARCH DESIGN
The aforementioned literature suggests that communities vary in their level of development
and stability, and further, that within a metropolitan area suburbs are in competition for development. Because of this situation we expect that each community will attempt to structure their
development policies to some strategic advantage. Our basic hypothesis can be stated as follows:
Suburban communities within the same metropolitan political economy will pursue economic
development dependent upon community need and competition.
This hypothesis can be further refined this way:
Suburban government officials' orientations toward, and policies for, economic development
will vary depending upon their perceptions of the community's development orientations,
needs, and the development policies of neighboring governments.
To assess the linkages between types of suburbs, development orientations and policies, and
perceived or actual intraregional competition, we sent surveys to all 261 suburbs in the Chicago
metropolitan area in August 1987. The suburbs are in six Illinois counties: Cook (the largest),
DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry, and Will.20 Responses were received from 105 communities,
or 40%.
A survey was developed to address development orientations and policies in the Chicago
metropolitan area. Initially, the survey was pretested on a group of city managers, mayors, and
development directors in 23 Chicago suburbs. The pretest was either telephone or personal
interview. 21 From the data gathered in the pretest, and the valuable suggestions of these officials,
the final survey was constructed and mailed to the suburbs addressed here.
The survey included both open and closed end questions. The questionnaire requested information about the city's economic development staff and their activities. We asked each respondent
to describe the city council's general policy on attracting and retaining economic development
activities. A series of closed-end questions explored the range of economic development activities,
policies, plans, fiscal incentives, and regulations related to economic development. The final part
of the survey asked about development in relation to other communities and the impact of
neighboring governments' policies on policy in the respondent's community.
The responses brought us a good mixture of old and new suburbs. In general, these suburbs share
a common political economy that tends to be defined by their proximity to (or from) Chicago, their
distance to the major interstate highways, and the availability of developable land in this region.

FINDINGS
Generally, the responses came from the publicly elected or appointed official in each suburb
that had the major responsibility for development policy. The 105 respondents included city
managers (36%), mayors/presidents (21 %), economic development directors/department heads
(15%), city clerks (9%), planners (7%), assistant city managers (6%), community development
directors (3%), city council members (who usually chaired a committee on development) (3%),
and a finance director (1 %).
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Older suburbs seem to
pursue development
aggressively in order to
main tain the job market
and expand or maintain
the fiscal base. But
newer, more prosperous
suburbs are aggressively
pursuing development
also. In the latter case,
the motivation appears
to be largely related to
fiscal expansion
considerations and not
job market concerns.

Orientations

To understand the variation in development policies and programs in suburbia, we believed that
the most important question to ask was about "the city council's general policy on attracting and
retaining economic development activities." The open-ended responses to this question and our
subsequent analysis of all other answers permitted us to arrive at a classification of development
policy orientations in these suburbs. This classification yields a typology of suburbs on development policy.
Table 1 shows the classification that resulted from our analysis of the responses to the "general
policy" questions and the subsequent review of other responses to policy-related questions. In a
few cases we found that the respondent had misrepresented or overstated the general policy. Our
decisions about the actual policy QTientation of the communities is shown in Table 1. We have
displayed the orientations from most aggressive on development to antidevelopment. As shown in
the table, 23 (22%) suburbs follow a general policy on economic development that can be labeled
"aggressive." These communities are very proactive and competitive in seeking development of
business or industrial activities. Councils have adopted a variety of aggressive marketing strategies
and have approved competitive fiscal and service policies to attract investment in the community.
A few of these communities followed general policies that placed some limits on the proactive
approach to gaining or retaining development, such as only seeking retail development or
following aggressive policies for limited geographic or economic sections of the community.
Intense competition for economic development is perceived by these suburbs' leaders. Older
suburbs seem to pursue development aggressively in order to maintain the job market and expand
or maintain the fiscal base. But newer, more prosperous suburbs are aggressively pursuing
development also. In the latter case, the motivation appears to be largely related to fiscal expansion
considerations and not job market concerns. 22
A second set of communities can be classified as "regulatory." These 13 communities do not
find it necessary actively to seek economic development. Because of the amount of developable
land in the suburb, they have the advantage of being able to wait for developers to come to them.
Furthermore, because of the attractive nature of their community, rather than making concessions
to stimulate development, they make demands of potential developers. They have significant
regulation of economic development, including an extensive array of fees and codes that must be
paid or met by each developer. Adherence to regulations that are believed to be in the public interest
is considered more important than development per se.
In all, 19 cities followed a general policy on development that is best described as "cooperative."
These communities follow policies that include moderately prodevelopment values. The council
has normally approved a limited range of economic development policies designed to create a
positive environment for business or industrial clients. In general, an aggressive development
stance is inconsistent with these relatively stable, established communities' values which often
promote the integrity of quality single-family dwellings. But a cooperative spirit helps to promote
stability and a gradual expansion in the economic development activity portion of the tax base.
A city council that is not promoting new business or industrial activity in the community may
value retention of the existing economic base above any new development. Indeed, 13 communities, many old, stable suburbs that are a mixture 23 of both residential and commercial components,
felI into this category. "Retentive" suburbs have adopted an extensive list of development policies,
but their strategy is to target these policies at existing businesses and industries that may need some
assistance or incentive to remain in the community.24 Maintaining the retail outlets in the older
downtowns often in competition with retail malls, is a common concern of policymakers in this
type of suburb. In a sense, this business base in a retaining suburb faces the same threats as the
central business districts (CBD) in many older central cities - declining physical plants, restricted
space for expansion, less shopper traffic, and limited parking. While this suburban type senses
competition from newer suburbs that have more space available or attractive indoor retail malls,
they have adopted a goal of stabilizing the present retail community rather than considering any
possible expansion. Policies tend to be developed that will improve the attractiveness of existing
retail areas for both businesses and customers. Generally, the strategy is to maintain the status quo.
Two forces seem to govern a retentive suburb's approach to industrial activity. First, the com-
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TABLE)

City Council Policy Orientations on Economic Development
Policy Orientation

Number

Percentage

Aggressive

23

21. 9

Regulatory

13

12.4

Cooperative

19

18.1

Retentive

13

12.4

Reactive

27

25. 7

9

8.6

105

100

Antidevelopment
Unknown/Missing Data
Total

0.9

munity has become comfortable with the present activities that are not a threat to the residential
community's quality of life. Second, because of limited undeveloped land, it is unlikely that the
community could attract new industry even if it tried.
Slightly more than one fourth of the cities in our study follow no formal policy on economic
development. Although a few have policies that address economic development issues, these cities
tend to react as development issues arise. Generally, these "reactive" communities are developed
suburbs. The only value of policy makers that seems apparent is laissez-faire. If economic activities
want to locate in their community, fine; if others choose to leave the community, thilt might be
fine, too. As long as economic development change does not present a significant threat to the tax
base or quality of residential life, the orientation of policymakers is to remain uninvolved
observers. However, policymakers do take action when necessary: when the possible loss of
business or industry could seriously affect the tax base, or when the proposed establishment of a
new development poses a threat to the quality of life or quality of service delivery. Hence, when
no general policy on economic development is considered necessary, these communities will react
to possible change with specific policies on a case-by-case basis.
The value orientations of the local councils have shaped the particular mix of policies followed
in each suburb and have determined the community government's competitive or cooperative
approach to development within the region. At least one suburban official indicated that the
community and its council were decidedly "antidevelopment." The remaining communities did
not provide an answer to the question about general policy or enough other information in the
questionnaire for us to accurately classify their policy orientation. But in the 95 suburbs for which
we have complete data, we are able to explore in more detail the nature of policies in use.
Institutional Capacity
Table 2 displays information about the capacity to implement economic development policy in
each of the five types of suburbs. Overall, just one third have an economic development plan (or
something like it as part of the city's comprehensive plan) approved by the council. Aggressive
policy suburbs have the highest ratio (52%) of economic development plans whereas retentive
suburbs have the smallest adoption ratio (15%). Also, between one and three suburbs of each policy
orientation had a growth policy to control development; however, none of the reactive suburbs
had used it. Another measure of a community's capacity to implement policy is having a
department and staff designated for economic development. Roughly half of aggressive and
retentive suburbs had a department for economic development. The lowest ratio (18%) of suburbs
with a designated department was found among those classified as reactive on economic development matters. Related to this item is the number of staff, who is from a line or staff department
or is a member of the chief executive's office, who work on economic development matters. It
may be interesting to note that, as shown in Table 2, the average number of staff is not closely
related to the character of the general policy. Suburbs with cooperative policy orientations had the
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TABLE 2

Capacity for Economic Development Policy Implementation
TOlal

Economic Development
Plan (percent)

Department
(percent)

Aggressive

23

52

48

3

Regulatory

13

31

31

3.25

Cooperative

19

26

37

4

Retentive

13

15

54

1.5

27

26

18

2

95

32

36

Policy Orientation

Reactive
Total

Average Staff

highest average staff, whereas the retentive suburbs used the least. And, on average, aggressive
suburbs used only one more staff than the group following the least aggressive policy - the reactive
policy suburbs.
Overall, the more aggressive the policy orientation, the wider the adoption of an economic
development plan and the greater the frequency of staff and departments for development.
Economic Development Activities

We found 67% of
suburbs to be engaged in
regular contacts with
businesses to ensure that
they do not relocate
without the city having
had an opportunity to
offer them an incentive
to remain.

Table 3 shows four sets of activities related to furthering economic development in which a
community may be involved. Profile refers to maintenance of either demographic, economic, or
tax ratelburden information about the community by the city government. This profile information
is used to help "sell" the community to prospective businesses or industries that are considering
locating in that suburb. 25 In all, 72% of suburbs maintain profiles. The use of profiles ranges from
a high of91 % among aggressive policy suburbs to 56% in reactive policy suburbs. Again, the more
aggressive the orientation, the more active the suburb in encouraging development. Coordinate
refers to city government activities, such as having a liaison/ombudsman office with business and
industry26 or working with a quasipublic development agency. Cities that engage in this activity
believe it is necessary to coordinate economic development objectives with the private sector in a
regular or formal way.27 Only 48% of suburbs in our survey engage in coordinating activities. The
ratio is somewhat higher than this among the aggressive policy suburbs (57%); it runs slightly
lower in suburbs with cooperative (47%) and reactive (41 %) policy orientations. In general, those
communities trying to keep their existing economic base or significantly expand it are more likely
to adopt coordinative policy.
Another set of actions is concerned with preserving the departing businesses and industries in
the community. We found 67% of suburbs to be engaged in regular contacts with businesses to
ensure that they do not relocate without the city having had an opportunity to offer them an
incentive to remain. Some cities have even adopted a formal policy on "business retention," or a
key public official has assumed the responsibility of working actively with businesses. In some
cases the mayor, village president, or city manager has adopted a proactive role in working to keep
existing businesses or industries in the community - a key variable for success found in many
studies of central city redevelopment. 28 In about one fifth of the suburbs, the city now owns
buildings for lease to businesses, especially those needing an incentive to stay in the community.
Again (Table 3), the aggressive policy suburbs are making the most use of this activity (83%),
whereas just under half (48%) of reactive policy suburbs have found it necessary to act on
preservation of the existing business base. Somewhat surprising is the finding that retentive suburbs
are only about average among cities doing preservation. The finding suggests a breakdown between
plan and action in the retentive policy communities. The last broad activity receiving wider use in
suburbs is self-promotion of various kinds. The most common forms were government-sponsored
advertisements in magazines or newspapers, press releases designed to create more awareness of
development opportunities, and the use of the Chamber of Commerce and other local promotion
agencies to sell the city, often providing city funding to the chamber to aid the local promotion
effort. Overall, 77% of suburbs in our study engage in promotion. This includes 100% of the
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TABLE 3

Economic Development Activities in Suburbs
Total
Policy Orientation

(N)

Aggressive

23

Regulatory

13

Coordinate
(percent)

Preserve
(percent)

Promote
(percent)

91

57

83

100

77

46

69

62

Profile
(percent)

Cooperative

19

68

47

74

74

Retentive

13

69

54

69

69

Reactive

27

56

41

48

70

95

72

48

67

77

Total

aggressive policy suburbs, followed by suburbs with cooperative (74%), reactive (70%), retentive
(69%), and regulatory (62%) policy orientations. Finding that regulatory suburbs are less likely to
be engaged in promotion is not surprising. These suburbs are well known, attractive locales for
developers and they can afford to be less aggressive because business and industry regularly pursue
them.
Fiscal Policies
Perhaps best known among the activities that communities engage in when shopping for
economic development are fiscal policies, especially tax breaks. Tax rates and levels are a major
concern of economic interest/ 9 and many communities have sought to create a competitive edge.
As shown in Table 3, most local governments maintain a ready tax burden profile showing how
favorably the suburb compares with surrounding communities. Table 4 shows the use of tax
incentives, loans, capital budgeting, and services underwriting by the Chicago suburbs. The most
widely used fiscal policy was some type of tax break for economic development. In our survey
54% of suburbs offered tax abatements and/or tax-exempt financing through Industrial Revenue
Bonds (IRB) for development. Again, we find the aggressive policy communities being significantly ahead of others in the use of tax incentives (83%), and nearly two-thirds of regulatory policy
suburbs are also offering them. These higher policy adoption rates contrast with a 33% usage rate
in the reactive policy suburbs.
The next most widely used fiscal policy for economic development is a loan program. The
actual form of the program varies across communities, and we were able to identify five different
features of loan incentives for development: (a) city government guarantees of loans for the private
sector, (b) city government providing below-market interest rate financing for development, (c)
interest rate reductions in which the city pays part of the normal interest charges to a lender on
behalf of a borrower, (d) leveraging economic development with Community Development Block
Orant funds, and (e) financing economic development through the sale of general obligation (00)
bonds.
Some cities' loan programs included all of the foregoing, though it was more common for loan
programs to encompass a smaller set of options. Table 4 shows that, overall, 42% of Chicago
suburbs have a loan program. Over half of aggressive policy suburbs have loan programs, while
fewer than half of the other policy type suburbs have them. In fact, only one-third of reactive policy
cities and a mere 23% of retentive policy communities have adopted these programs.
Another way to encourage economic development is to use the city budget directly to finance
or underwrite some private sector development. For example, 30% of responding suburban
officials in Table 4 told us that their community uses the capital budget to finance major economic
development projects. Although only a handful of regulatory (15%), retentive (23%), and reactive
(19%) policy suburbs have adopted such a program, nearly one-third of cooperative policy
communities have approved such financing and more than one-half (57%) of aggressive policy
suburbs have done the same. Some of these suburbs also pay for city services needed by industry.
Of suburbs in Table 4, 30% have adopted policies under which the city pays for improvements in
water distribution systems, waste treatment, or transportation systems in order to attract develop-
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TABLE 4

Fiscal and Tax Polices for Economic Development
Total
Policy Orientation

(N)

Tax
Incentives
(percent)

Loan
Program
(percent)

Capital
Budget
(percent)

Pay for
Services
(percent)

Aggressive

23

83

57

57

48

Regulatory

13

62

46

15

31

Cooperative

19

42

47

32

37

Retentive

13

54

23

23

23

Reactive
Total

27

33

33

19

15

95

54

42

30

30

ment. Adoption of such service underwriting policies is employed by 48% of aggressive policy
suburbs but by 37% or less of the other suburbs. Indeed, only 15% of reactive policy suburbs do
this and even then it was probably a response to a single case and not a general policy.
Overall, fiscal and tax policies are most often found among the policy adoptions of more
aggressive policy communities.
Land Use Policy
A few minor programs are being used in these suburbs to attract development also. For instance,
42% of the Chicago suburbs have at least one industrial park and 7% of them are owned by the
suburb. Zoning or land use plans in 58% of the communities expressly reserve land for future
industrial development. And in recent years land use controls and zoning policies have been
changed in 39% of the suburbs in order "to attract more economic development."
Competition
Are the policies being adopted, plans being formulated, and programs being modified because
of competition from other jurisdictions in the metropolitan political economy? We asked suburban
officials about competition with other suburbs for the same developments. A great deal of
competition was perceived by 39% of the suburbs, most of which had adopted policies to keep
their communities competitive. Another 36% experienced "some competition." Some 10% of
Chicago suburban officials found very little competition from other suburbs, while 15% said that
"no competition" existed. There was little variation across our typology on this question. Competition also turns out to be a better explanation than is diffusion for economic development policy
adoption. 30 Only 3 of 105 suburbs adopted an economic development policy from those successfully used by neighboring suburbs and only two suburbs had avoided a policy that had failed in
another suburb. And as these suburban officials looked to the future, 94% believed that they would
find "the same" or "more" competition in the next year.
Regulation Versus Development
As addressed here, at least one policy type apparent in suburbs is that of the regulator. The
character of these suburbs seems to be one of close adherence to zoning, capital improvement
plans, and development regulations. These suburbs assess fees for virtually every phase of the
development process from the review of plans to utility connections to land dedications for parks,
schools, or libraries.
We asked all suburban officials in the survey about the extent of regulation on economic
development. The results are shown in Table 5. Initially, we wanted to know if a suburb could be
described as one in which concern with regulating business and industrial development was of
greater concern than finding ways to attract development. Overall, 53% of responding officials
indicated that this was the case. Table 5 shows (under "Regulation not Development") that all
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TABLES

Regulation of Economic Development
Policy
Orientation

Total

Aggressive

23

(N)

Utility
Hook
(percent)

Connect
Fee
(percent)

35

39

30

4

0

92

92

85

54

31

Annet
Fee
(percent)

Plan
Fee
(percent)

30

22

Regulation
not Development
(percent)

Service
Land
Impact Fee
Ded
(percent) (percent)

Regulatory

13

100

69

Cooperative

19

47

21

32

47

58

16

21

Retentive

13

62

38

54

46

46

23

23

Reactive

27

48

22

44

48

7

53

31

47

52

52
. 52

30

95

23

14

Total

regulatory policy suburbs fall into this category compared to only 30% of the aggressive ones.
Concern with regulation over development was also apparent in 47-48% of cooperative and
reactive and 62% of retentive policy suburbs.
The types of regulation in use also provide some interesting contrasts. In every example of
regulation, the largest ratio of suburbs employing it is found among the regulatory ones, while the
smallest level of regulatory adoption is nearly always among the aggressive suburbs. For instance,
although 69% of regulatory suburbs require developers to pay a fee for land annexation to the city,
typically only about one-fifth of other suburbs have a similar policy. A total of 92% of regulators
assess a fee for city review of development plans, yet only 32% of cooperative and 35% of
aggressive policy suburbs require such fees. Nearly all regulatory suburbs require developers to
install all utility lines to the point of the nearest city feeder line, and also require payment of a fee
for the actual connection. Only about half of other suburbs have similar regulations, with the
adoption rate between 30% and 39% in aggressive suburbs. More than half of regulatory policy
communities require the dedication of land or payment of a fee for future parks, schools, or
libraries; a mere 4% of aggressive policy suburbs have a land dedication policy. Finally, while
31 % of regulators make developers pay a "services impact fee" during the time of construction,
none of the aggressive suburbs do this. The wide adoption of regulation is clearly paramount among
our regulatory suburbs. The policy orientation of these suburbs can be described as "Here is what
you must do to locate here" rather than "What can we do to get you to locate here?" which is
dominant in more aggressive suburbs.

DISCUSSION
This article has presented a descriptive analysis of the urban economic development policy
orientations in the suburbs of a major metropolitan area. The suburban government officials in this
shared metropolitan political economy experience some of the same problems as do the central
cities of this country. Each community has assessed its need or desire for further expansion or
retention of the economic base in light of community orientations and the perceived level of
competition around its borders.
The policy orientations on development matters in this sample fall into five general types.
Aggressive policy suburbs have responded to development issues with the widest array of policy
adoptions. Although only about half have put together a plan for economic development, they have
among the best capacities for development, they are engaged in the most active forms of
community promotion, and they have the most comprehensive set of fiscal and tax policy
incentives for economic interests. Careful regulation of development is not a top priority, however.
In many ways the aggressive suburbs act like central cities in their pursuit of development; a key
difference is their likely newer physical plant.
A second type of suburb also encourages development but with attention to regulations not
incentives. These regulatory suburbs are attractive sites for development and they need not give
much to get economic base expansion. A third group of suburbs was found to follow a cooperative
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wproach to development policy: a gradual expansion of economic development but with careful
attention to the maintenance of the community's current character. Most of these are engaged in
community promotion, and more than one-third offer fiscal policy incentives to development
concerns.
A fourth group of suburbs were found to be oriented toward care of current economic interests.
Retaining the present economic base with tax incentives, downtown business cooperative efforts,
and coordinated activities with the private sector were the norm. And finally, the largest number
of suburbs had no general policy on development. They simply reacted in response to development
issues as they arose. In most policy areas they followed the most limited approach, usually adopting
economic development policies when a need arose.
Support for our hypothesis regarding the impact of orientations on policy adoptions was
apparent in the survey. The more a,ggressive the general policy toward development, the more
likely the adoption of specific economic development policies. In addition, with little variation
across our typology, we found perceived competition to be an apparent stimulus for adopted
policies. However, although the survey has given us a glimpse into the economic development
world of the suburbs, we need to move beyond the descriptive approach presented in this article.
Future analyses must examine the multivariate causes of suburban development policy adoptions.
Specifically, the relative impact of orientation type compared to other community variables, such
as size, economic/tax base, and form of government, among others, should be assessed. At this
point, we believe that the survey has given us a better understanding of the types of suburbs when
considering urban economic development questions.
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